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INTRODUCTION
On July 11, 2000, at the American Bar Association (“ABA”) annual
meeting in New York City, the ABA House of Delegates dealt a
powerful blow to the proponents of multidisciplinary practice by
overwhelmingly voting for the prohibition of such practices.1
One year earlier, in June of 1999, the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice2 (“the Commission”) presented a report3 to
the ABA House of Delegates recommending changes to the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct4 (“Model Rules”) that would

1. See John Gibeaut, House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 2000, at 92, 92.
2. See Dianne Molvig, Multidisciplinary Practices:  Service Package of the Future?, WIS.
LAW., Apr. 1999, at 10, 11 (describing Multidisciplinary Practices as “[p]artnership[s]
owned by lawyers and professionals from other disciplines who work together to solve
client problems”).  The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice proposed the
following definition to add to the “Terminology” section of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct:
“Multidisciplinary practices (MDP)” denotes a partnership, professional
corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers and
nonlawyers and has one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a
client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing
nonlegal, as well as legal, services.  It includes an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide services, and
there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, App. A, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2000)
[hereinafter ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A] (emphasis added).
3. See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2000)
[hereinafter Report to the House of Delegates] (stating that the report was submitted to
the House of Delegates).  The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, which
was created in August 1998, submitted a report to the ABA House of Delegates in
June 1999.  See id.  The ‘Report to the House of Delegates’ contained the following
sections:  (1) Recommendation; (2) Report; (3) Appendix A—Recommendations of
possible amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; (4) Appendix B—
Witnesses at ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Hearings and others
submitting written comments to the Commission; (5) Appendix C—Reporter’s
Notes; and (6) General Information Form.  See id.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983) (amended 1999) (noting that
rules were enacted in 1983).  The Model Rules replaced the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which was promulgated in 1969.  The Model Code
embodied a wholesale revision of the previous ethical guidelines produced by the
ABA, the canons of Professional Ethics.  See id.  Before 1969, the Canons of
Professional Ethics guided the ABA for sixty-one years.  See id.  Approximately forty-
one states have adopted a version of the Model Rules.  See ABA Comm. on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice:  Issues and
Developments, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreport0199.html (last visited
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allow lawyers to offer legal services and practice law outside the
traditional law firm structure.5  The proposed changes would allow
lawyers to join other professionals to create so-called
“multidisciplinary practice” firms (“MDPs”), entities that provide
legal and other professional services.6  Currently, Model Rule 5.4,
which aims to protect lawyers’ independence, prohibits lawyers from
sharing legal fees with non-lawyers or from forming a partnership
that is engaged in the practice of law with a non-lawyer.7  Although

Jan. 9, 2000) (citing ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 91:401) [hereinafter
Background Paper] (describing the development of the MDP and the important issues
surrounding it that the legal profession must address).  Furthermore, all fifty states,
except the District of Columbia, observe prohibitions nearly identical to the fee
sharing bans included in Model Rule 5.4.  See id.  Except for the Washington, D.C.
jurisdiction, all fifty states prohibit fee sharing with non-lawyers.  See id. at n.41.  For
the District of Columbia rule, see Part II.B, infra (elaborating on unique fee sharing
rules, such as that of the District of Columbia), and see also the ABA Comm. on MDP,
App. A, supra note 2, which proposes a new rule, Model Rule 5.8 governing
multidisciplinary practices, to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  For the text
of proposed rule 5.8, see infra note 155.
5. See Background Paper, supra note 4 (stating that Model Rule 5.4 prohibits
lawyers and non-lawyers from forming partnerships where the business of the
partnership is to practice law).  Model Rule 5.4, titled Professional Independence of
Lawyer, states that:
(a) A lawyer shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the
estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;
and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or
in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a non-lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983) (amended 1990).
6. See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates,
Recommendation, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2000) (allowing lawyers to share legal fees with nonlawyers).  The
Commission’s recommendations must be adopted in each state before lawyers in that
state are able to form MDPs.  Molvig, supra note 2, at 45.
7. See supra note 5 to view Rule 5.4 in its entirety.
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such firms already operate in Europe and Canada, the ethical rules
governing the practice of law in America prohibit MDPs.8
At the ABA annual meeting in August 1999 in Atlanta, the ABA
postponed action on a recommendation to end the self-imposed ban
on fee sharing with non-attorneys.9  The ABA wanted to wait for the
states to conduct further investigation of the MDP issue before
making a decision on whether or not to permit such practices.10  At
the 2000 annual meeting, even though many state committees that
were formed to study MDPs had not finished their reports on the
desirability of MDPs, the House of Delegates voted against relaxing
the Model Rules, a measure the Commission had advocated in its
recommendation to the House a year earlier.11
The growth of MDPs abroad created a movement among members
of the American legal community to loosen the current restrictions
on fee sharing.12  Because many lawyers are already effectively
practicing law in non-legal settings,13 particularly among the so-called

8. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
9. See ABA Delays Action on MDPs, ABA Press Release (Aug. 10, 1999), at
http://www.abanet.org./media/aug99/mdp.html (last visited Jan. 9 , 2000) (noting
that the ABA House of Delegates postponed action on MDPs until further study
revealed such changes could made to the Model Rules without compromising lawyer
independence and loyalty to clients).
10. See Siobhan Roth, Bar Going Nowhere Fast on MDPs, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21,
2000, at 1, 16 (stating that the state bars were forced into confronting the issue
because the Commission on MDP created alarm among the members of the bar).  At
the ABA’s mid-year meeting in Dallas, no action was taken on MDP.  The ABA is not
going to take any action until the state MDP commissions discuss their own findings.
The state MDP commissions will also read the ABA Commission’s upcoming April
report.  See id.  When the House of Delegates made its decision that upheld the
current rules on fee sharing, twenty-three states had not finished their studies on
MDPs, and ten states that had finished studies had not taken any action.  Gibeaut,
supra note 1, at 93.  At the July 2000 meeting, a number of state bars, including those
from Ohio, Florida, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey, sponsored the resolution
supporting the current rules that prohibit MDPs.  See id.  The House of Delegates
supported the resolution by a margin of 314-106.  See id.
11. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 93 (stating that many state and local bars had not
had enough time to fully consider the idea fee sharing between lawyers and non-
lawyers).
12. See Siobhan Roth, ABA Report:  What Now?, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 1999, at 12
(attributing the creation of the MDP Commission in part to the rapid growth of
MDPs in Europe); David Rubenstein, How the Big Six Firms are Practicing Law in Europe,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 32 (noting that economic globalization is pushing
accounting firms into legal practice); cf. Charles Hogan, Accountancy:  Law Society’s
Protection Ban Under Pressure, SUNDAY BUS. POST, Feb. 21, 1999, (describing a new Irish
firm closely associated with PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which has rekindled the
debate over MDPs in the United States); A. J. Noble, The Metamorphosis:  Ernst &
Young Already Manages a “Captive” Law Firm in Toronto.  Is this the Dawn of the
Profession’s Future?, AM. LAW., July 1999, at 51 (noting that Ernst & Young established
a captive law firm in Toronto known as Donahue & Partners).
13. See Nathan Koppel, MDP Rift Splits Bar:  Some Lawyers Feel There’s a Target on
Their Back, TEX. LAW., Feb. 21, 2000, at 1 (“[L]awyers do practice law at accounting
firms–they simply do it on the sly, free from confidentiality and conflict-of-interest
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Big 5 accounting firms,14 the ABA reacted out of necessity in
addressing the MDP issue.15  At the ABA mid-year meeting, held in
February 2000 in Dallas, Texas, proponents of MDPs pleaded with the
ABA to act on the MDP issue.  A speaker at the meeting stated, “[i]t
falls upon me to bring a sense of urgency into the discussion.  MDPs
are taking over our practice, and you are next.”16  It seems clear that
while the ABA decides to oppose MDPs, the market for legal services
is approaching its destination—integrated firms that provide a myriad
of client services at one firm.
Those who oppose the recommended changes to the Model Rules
cite many potential pitfalls of practicing law in the MDP setting.  In
particular, critics of MDPs believe that conflicts of interest between
lawyers and their non-lawyer partners will often arise; that
confidentiality duties of lawyers will conflict with those of non-lawyers;
that lawyers will not be able to use independent judgment because of
financial pressures; and that the attorney-client privilege will be
eroded because of potential confidentiality breaches.17  In addition,
some members of the ABA fear that the financial pressures within
MDPs will diminish lawyers’ commitment to pro bono work.18  Finally,
opponents fear that MDPs will have an adverse impact on the fiscal
health of existing law practices, although many lawyers dispute this
assertion.19

rules that burden licensed tax lawyers.”).
14. The Big 5 Accounting Firms consists of PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst
& Young, Arthur Andersen, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and KMPG Peat Marwick.
For example, only 20% of Arthur Andersen’s 1997 revenue of $5.2 billion came from
auditing.  John E. Morris, King Arthur’s March on Europe—Arthur Andersen is on a
Mission to Conquer the Continent’s High-End Legal Markets.  Can the Accountants Beat the
Lawyers at Their Own Game?, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 49.
15. See Richard Pena, Where Do We Go From Here?, 62 TEX. B.J. 328, 328 (1999)
(warning that the bar must change if it is to survive).
16. See Koppel, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining the urgency in fashioning MDP
regulations).
17. See infra Part I.B (discussing the counter-arguments to the creation of MDPs);
ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, Report, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2000) [hereinafter
Report] (listing the core values of the legal profession that could be adversely affected
by multidisciplinary practices).
18. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan’s World:  A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare,
55 BUS. LAW. 1533, 1552 (arguing that pro bono work will be sacrificed if MDPs are
allowed).  Mr. Fox goes on to explain, “A number of times lawyers in corporate
America have told me they would love to help but their company’s shareholders
would be ‘up in arms’ if it came to light that they were representing the despicable
denizens of Death Row.”  Id.
19. See Ward Bower, ABA Report Endorses MDPs:  What Should Your Firm Do?, LAW
FIRM P’SHIP & BEN. REP., July 1999, at 3 (recognizing that MDPs can encroach upon
traditional law firm practice in areas, such as labor, environmental, tax, regulatory,
business practice and “big ticket” litigation); see also ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary
Practice, House of Delegates Debate, Annual Meeting 1999, at http://www.abanet.org/
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Supporters of eliminating the ABA’s ban on fee sharing20 maintain
that MDPs are an inevitable and necessary outgrowth of the growing
complexity of conducting business and personal affairs in the
information age.21  Advocates of “one-stop shopping” believe that
clients should be able to satisfy their commercial and personal needs
with the help of only one firm.22  These supporters urge that clients,
whether they are large, small, international, or local, need
comprehensive services from a team of professionals skilled in tax,
engineering, insurance, technology, law, and financing.23  Likewise,
on an individual level, “[a]n hourly worker factory worker hurt on
the job . . . will need to see a psychologist for his emotional trauma,
an insurance specialist to help him file for disability benefits, a social
worker, who can counsel his family, and perhaps a lawyer if a suit is
appropriate.”24
In addition to providing clients with a wider array of services, MDPs
promote greater freedom of association for lawyers, allowing them to
form law practices with non-lawyers.25  Just as MDPs benefit corporate
and individual clients, they can provide an unlimited possibility of
professional partnerships for lawyers working in large and small

cpr/mdphouse.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2000) [hereinafter House of Delegates Debate]
(statement of Philip S. Anderson) (noting that mid-level law firms that represent
banks with continuing filing requirement could be wiped out by competing MDPs).
But see id. (statement of Lawrence J. Fox) (remarking that Model Rule 5.4 is not a
turf protection rule for lawyers, but rather a rule that allows lawyers to remain in
control of the legal process).
20. When the Model Rules replaced the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1983, there was a proposal to end the prohibition against fee
sharing with non-lawyers.  See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates, Gen. Info. Form, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpgeninfo.html
(last visited Jan. 9, 2000).  The recommendation, which was defeated, permitted
passive investment in law firms.  The Commission’s recommendation does not
propose allowing passive investment in law firms.  See id.
21. See Direction of Legal Profession is Debated at Multidisciplinary Practice Panel
Hearings, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 2, at 45 (Feb. 17, 1999)
(citing one participant, who said that the complexity of today’s environment requires
different professionals with different expertise).
22. See id. at 44 (quoting a participant who felt that consumers should not have to
use multiple firms when they could get the same services at a single entity).
23. See id. at 45 (mentioning a participant’s thoughts, which were that clients
need comprehensive solutions from a team of professionals—lawyers, accountants,
and other professionals).
24. Koppel, supra note 14, at 1; see John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Shaping the Future of Law:  ABA’s Multidisciplinary Practice Proposals Will Stymie the Growth
of MDPs, Golden Age is Over, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at 27 (noting that consumer
groups have stated that low and middle income individuals would benefit if MDPs
were created); Tug of War, INT’L ACCOUNTING BULL., Mar. 25, 1998, at 5 n.225 (citing
a person’s desire to merge his Elderly Law Practice with an accountant and money
manager).
25. See Koppel, supra note 14, at 1 (providing an example of a firm that hires
both lawyers and non-lawyers).
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firms.26  Under a scheme free of burdensome regulations, lawyers
could form partnerships with other professionals to provide a vast
array of services.27  Thus, a lawyer could form a practice with a
financial planner and social worker “to provide legal and non-legal
services in connection with counseling older clients about estate
planning, nursing home care, and living wills.”28  Low barriers to
entry would allow lawyers and other professionals to set up an MDP
with little capital, while a highly regulated scheme would favor large
MDPs such as the Big 5.  In a highly regulated scheme, large MDPs
would be better positioned to sustain a heavy regulatory burden with
their greater economies of scale.29
This Comment argues that the ABA should amend the Model
Rules to permit MDPs.  The ABA’s Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice proposed changes to the ABA House of Delegates to
accomplish this goal.  A Fully Integrated Model30 for an MDP, such as
the model proposed by the ABA and the model endorsed in this
Comment, will provide the fewest barriers to entry in setting up an
MDP.  A simple model with few regulations will ensure that lawyers
who operate in both large and small firms will more effectively satisfy
their clients’ needs.31
Part I of this Comment outlines the history of the MDP debate
including some background on the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice and arguments for and against allowing
MDPs.  Part II describes the various models under which some form
of MDPs would be permitted.  Part II also examines MDP
arrangements in Canada and Europe.  Part III explains why MDPs
can and should exist, focusing on how ethical rules can be observed
in MDPs just as in any other law practice.  Part IV describes the
Commission’s proposed rule that permits MDPs.  Next, this
Comment endorses the Commission’s recommendation, with two
proposed changes.  This Comment proposes:  (1) a change in the
imputed disqualification/conflict of interest rules; and (2) a change

26. See Roth, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that support from MDPs is coming from
consumer advocates, solo practitioners, accounting firms, and even big law firms).
27. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that the audit
requirement in the recommendation would impose a barrier to entry that would
inhibit the growth of non-lawyer-controlled MDPs in the United States).
28. Report, supra note 17.
29. For example of a rigid system that might suit only larger firms, see the
discussion of the Contract Model, supra note 99 and accompanying text.  As more
regulations and formalities will create more overhead, firms with higher revenues
may be better positioned to cover the expenses.
30. See infra notes 100 & 105 and accompanying text.
31. See supra Part V (recommending an MDP model with few barriers).
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in the regulatory scheme for non-lawyer-controlled MDPs.  This
Comment concludes by urging the ABA to amend the Model Rules to
allow for MDPs at the earliest possible date.  Timely action is
necessary to allow large firms to better service their multinational
clients, and to allow small firms to better service small businesses and
individuals.32
I. THE MDP DEBATE:  HISTORY, PROS, AND CONS
In August 1998, the ABA first confronted the MDP issue by forming
the twelve-person Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.33
Subsequently, the Commission presented a number of questions
regarding the MDP issue for public comment.34  After reviewing the

32. See Roth, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that as the marketplace moves, lawyers
may forfeit the chance to write their own rules).
33. See Background Paper, supra note 4 (noting that the new Commission consisted
of practitioners, judges, and academicians).
34. See id.  The Commission submitted the following questions to the public for
comment:
1.  How would clients be harmed or benefited by amending the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) to permit a lawyer to enter into
a partnership with a nonlawyer or enter into other arrangements that permit
fee sharing with a nonlawyer?  Can any specific instances of harm to a client
by such a change be identified in either the United States or a foreign
jurisdiction?  If the benefits to clients would outweigh the harm, what
restrictions, if any, should the Commission recommend?  Should restrictions
follow or differ from those adopted in Rule 5.4 of the Washington, D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct?
2.  How, at all, would a lawyer’s independent professional judgment be
impaired by changing the Model Rules to permit a lawyer to enter into a
partnership with a nonlawyer or enter into other arrangements that permit
fee sharing with a nonlawyer?
3.  How, if at all, are the professional standards that govern the conduct of
accounting firms different from those that govern the conduct of lawyers
and law firms?  How do any differences in professional standards impact on
the protections offered to clients and the public?
4.  If the Model Rules were amended to permit a lawyer to deliver legal
services to the clients of a non-law firm entity at which the lawyer is employed
or of which the lawyer is a partner (i.e., accounting firm, gerontological
consulting firm, engineering firm, etc.)
(a) what changes, if any, should be made (1) to protect client confidentiality,
i.e., information relating to the representation (Rule 1.6); and (2) to assure
the lawyer’s avoidance of conflicts of interest (Rules 1.7-1.9)?
(b) what changes, if any, should be made to the general rule on imputed
disqualification (Rule 1.10)?  Should all clients of the non-law firm entity be
treated as if they were clients of the lawyer?
(c) What changes, if any, should be made to the rules on the responsibilities
of a partner or supervisory lawyer (Rule 5.1), the responsibilities of a
subordinate lawyer (Rule 5.2), the supervision of nonlawyer assistants (Rule
5.3), the unauthorized practice of law (Rule 5.5(b)), the responsibilities
regarding law-related services (Rule 5.7); and on advertising and solicitation
(Rules 7.1-7.5)?
(d) Should the Model Rules be amended to permit the discipline of law
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comments and holding hearings, the Commission submitted a report
to the ABA House of Delegates in June of 1999.35  The Commission
recommended that the ABA add a new rule—Model Rule 5.8—to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.36  Although this proposed rule
would permit MDPs, the proposed rule would subject them to a
number of regulations, especially in instances where non-lawyers
control the MDP.37  After much debate at the ABA annual meeting in
Atlanta, Georgia, the ABA House of Delegates delayed action on the
Commission’s proposal until more information on MDPs could be
obtained.38
Unlike the contentious meeting in 1999, the House of Delegates at
the 2000 meeting did not even debate the Commission’s proposal.39
Instead the delegates voted by a 3-to-1 margin for a resolution that
preserves the ABA’s ban on fee sharing, effectively ending any
chances of changing the Model Rules to permit MDPs.40  In fact, the
House of Delegates did not even vote on the MDP Commission’s
proposal that was submitted in Atlanta and instead voted to disband
the two-year old Commission.41
A. Support for MDPs
Those who support MDPs maintain that clients want MDPs because
they provide both legal and non-legal services within a single firm.42
At a Commission hearing in 1999, one participant explained,
“‘[p]rohibiting lawyers from practicing law in firms that specialize in
a variety of other business services means that the consumer has to
use multiple firms to provide services that could be more efficiently
provided by a single entity . . . .’”43  With the internationalization of

firms and/or MDPs?
(e) What changes, if any, should be made to the Rules?
Id.
35. See Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 3.
36. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (detailing the proposed changes
to the Model Rules as part of the Commission’s recommendation).
37. See id. (stating that a lawyer may practice in a non-lawyer-controlled MDP if
the MDP submits to annual audit by the highest court in each jurisdiction); see also
infra note 155 (discussing the proposed rule).
38. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (explaining that the House of
Delegates would not change the Model Rules until additional study showed that it
was in the public interest).
39. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 92.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Eleanor W. Myers, Multidisciplinary Practice Debate Continues:  It’s Time to
Redefine What We as Lawyers Really Do, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12, 1999, at 11, 11
(stating that some see the MDP debate as “simple client preference for efficient,
seamless, and cost effective service”).
43. Direction of Legal Profession is Debated at Multidisciplinary Practice Panel Hearings,
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commerce, corporations have a growing need for integrated
services.44  Moreover, consumer groups have also expressed a need
for multidisciplinary services that cater to middle and low-income
individuals, senior citizens, and families.45  Community resources
centers, family resource centers, gerontological counseling centers,
and real estate planning firms are examples of multidisciplinary
arrangements that could benefit non-corporate clients.46
Proponents of MDPs assert that the American legal profession may
be left behind if the ABA and state bar associations do not permit the
legal profession to engage in some form of multidisciplinary
practice.47  As two commentators suggest, “If the ABA chooses to slow
down or stop the development of [MDPs], we predict that Europe
will become the 21st century hub of legal commerce as multinational
companies, including U.S. corporations, turn to law firms and
international professional service firms with offices in London,

supra note 21, at 44 (quoting Mark K. Phigler, of Americans for Competitive
Communications, who took a pro-MDP stance at the hearings).
44. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that even though
opponents of MDPs believe that the Big 5 accounting firms have manufactured
demand for integrated services, the fundamental changes occurring in commerce,
such as internationalization, has created a need for MDPs).
45. See id. at 27 (stating that consumer groups have advocated multidisciplinary
practices as a way to benefit their constituents and that traditional lawyers and law
offices were often intimidating to consumers).
46. See id. (noting that consumers need counseling centers, family mediation
clinics, and community resource centers).  See generally Gary A. Munneke, Dances with
Nonlawyers:  A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 564-
65 (1992) (noting that law firms traditionally retained other professionals to provide
specific non-legal services).
47. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (predicting that Europe will
become the 21st century hub of legal services for corporations if the ABA halts the
development of MDPs).  In their article, Dzienkowski & Peroni not only advocate
MDPs, but they criticize the restrictions imposed on non-lawyer-controlled MDPs,
such as the proposed audit and filings requirements.  See id.; see also Lewis E. Elicker,
III, Room to Get Along, PA. LAW (July/Aug. 1999), at 16, 16 (suggesting that in the
short run, lawyers may regulate themselves, but in the long run, the public must
decide the kinds of law services it wants); Ritchenya A. Shepard, Law and Finance
Under One Roof, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A21 (discussing the Legg
Mason/Bingham Dana strategic alliance that was created in spite of the ABA’s
reluctance to permit multidisciplinary practice).  The Legg Mason/Bingham Dana
alliance is an example of a law firm and investment firm creatively working within the
current ethical rules to provide clients with multidisciplinary services.  See id.
At one of the Commission hearings that was held prior to issuing the
Recommendation, Ernst & Young’s General Counsel, Katherine Oberly, stated:
Absent a change in the rules, I suggest that U.S. lawyers will find themselves
at a competitive disadvantage, because they will lack the “bench strength”
and depth of resources to service client needs.  This may explain the rush to
mergers among large law firms in the United States, and the vigorous merger
discussions between U.S. and European law firms.
ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Remarks on the Report and Recommendations of
the ABA Commission on MDPs, Statement of Kathryn Oberly, at http://www.abanet.org
/cpr/oberly1.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Statement of Kathryn Oberly].
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Frankfurt, and Geneva.”48  MDP supporters also argue that the ABA
must act soon because de facto MDPs,49 such as the Big 5 accounting
firms and the quasi-legal services they offer, already exist.50
Accordingly, MDP supporters argue that the ABA should permit
MDPs to allow large American firms to compete with their European
counterparts, but that the ABA should frame the rules on its own
terms so that it remains in control of the MDP issue.51
B. Support for the Current Ban on Fee Sharing
The House of Delegates decision to uphold the current rules which
prohibit fee sharing, and thus MDPs stemmed from the belief that
such arrangements are inconsistent with the core values of the legal
profession.52  In addition to barring MDP arrangements, the ABA at
its July 2000 meeting also passed a resolution directing individual
states to prosecute entities they believe are unlawfully delivering legal
services.53
1. The unauthorized practice of law
Many in the U.S. legal community have expressed strong beliefs

48. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27.  This Comment endorses other
ideas proposed by Professor Dzienkowski regarding the MDP issue, such as possible
modifications to the rule on imputed conflicts for both MDPs and law firms.  See infra
Part V.B.
49. See ABA Refuses to Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of MDPs Dispel Concerns, 15
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) No. 15, at 396-97 (Aug.  18, 1999)
(describing the existence of MDPs as “de facto” because lawyers are providing legal
services to clients under the guise of consulting).
50. See James Wilber, American Bar Association States Our Position on MDPs, 7 Sept.
NEV. LAW 8, 10 (1999) (suggesting that the ABA’s voice could be marginalized in the
continuing debate on MDPs if the ABA placed an outright ban on multidisciplinary
practice).
51. See Pena, supra note 15, at 328 (comparing the ABA’s current situation to that
of the AMA in the 1990s, automakers in the 1970s and 80s, and timber workers in the
1980s, all of whom lost perspective with changing trends in their respective
industries); Wilber, supra note 50, at 9 (“World-wide market forces are much stronger
than the ability of one nation’s legal profession to hold those forces at bay, even if
that nation is the United States.”).
52. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 92 (listing an excerpt from the resolution
adopted by the House of Delegates at the 2000 meeting, which stated “‘[t]he sharing
of legal fees with nonlawyers and the ownership and control of the practice of the
law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession’”).
Recent crackdowns on the Big 5 by the Securities Exchange Commission for
independence violations may have added weight to the arguments against letting the
Big 5 officially enter the legal field.  See John Gibeaut, MDP in SEC Crosshairs, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 2000, at 16, 16  (stating that SEC discovered “more than 8,000 violations of
government and professional independence rules by PricewaterhouseCoopers
managers and partners who invested in audit clients”).
53. See Nathan Koppel, What, Me Worry?, AM. LAW., Sept. 2000, at 23 (noting that
prosecuting entities for the unauthorized practice of law is difficult because the
practice of law has never been clearly defined).
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that lawyers at the Big 5 are engaging in “civil disobedience”
whenever they provide legal services because of the current ban on
practicing law in a multidisciplinary setting.54  Critics label such
practice “civil disobedience” because they believe that lawyers, acting
under the guise of consultants, violate unauthorized practice of law
(“UPL”) statutes, which are included in the statutory scheme of every
state.55  Attorneys at the Big 5 deny that they are practicing law, but
instead insist that they merely provide consulting services in areas
such as tax, real estate transactions, regulatory compliance, and pre-
trial preparation.56  Although the work of these “consultants” mirrors
legal services, the consultants provide their clients with a disclaimer
stating that their work does not constitute a valid legal opinion.57
Opponents of MDP view enforcement of UPL statutes as a way of
policing companies such as the Big 5 for UPL violations to the point
that the ABA passed the resolution urging states to actively prosecute

54. See House of Delegates Debate, supra note 19 (statement of Lawrence J. Fox)
(claiming that the actions of certain lawyers at Big 5 companies constitutes “civil
disobedience”).
55. For example, the District of Columbia’s Unauthorized Practice of Law
provision falls under the D.C. Rules of Court.  Rule 49, titled “Unauthorized Practice
of Law,” states:
(a) General Rule.  No person shall engage in the practice of law in the
District of Columbia or in any manner hold out as authorized or competent
to practice law in the District of Columbia unless enrolled as an active
member of the District of Columbia Bar, except as otherwise provided by
these Rules.
D.C. R. CT. 49(a).  On the other hand, Maryland has adopted the Model Rules
provision, also titled “Unauthorized Practice of Law,” which states that:
A lawyer shall not:
(a)practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
MD. R. CT. 5.5.  This court rule applies to lawyers.  The statutory provision under the
Maryland Business Occupations and Professional Code states:  “[A] person may not
practice, attempt to practice, or offer to practice law in the State unless admitted to
the Bar.”  MD. CODE ANN. BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-601(a) (1995).
One of the main points of the MDP discussion taken by opponents is that UPL
needs to be more clearly defined if it is to be enforced.  Gary Blankenship, UPL
Investment, Overhaul Net Results for Consumers, FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 1, 1999, at 6 (citing
one commentator who feels that the only way to permit certain aspects of
multidisciplinary practices is to change the rules regarding the unauthorized practice
of law).
56. See id. (statement of Sherwin P. Simmons, Chairman of the ABA Commission
on MDP) (identifying what lawyers at various companies deem consulting services,
when in reality the services appear to be legal services).
57. See Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisioning a Big 5 Law Firm:  Ernst and
Young Positioning to Offer Full Legal Services, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1 (noting
that CPA firms already employ lawyers who maintain that, when assisting clients, they
are not practicing law).
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entities engaging in such unlawful conduct.58  At the 1999 meeting,
there was a sense that states were not enforcing UPL statutes against
the five thousand lawyers with bar memberships who are currently
offering legal services at the Big 5 consulting firms.59
2. Preserving the core values of the legal profession
Critics of MDPs also argue that lawyers will compromise the core
values of the legal profession if they are allowed to practice law at
non-lawyer-controlled MDPs.60  These core values include lawyer
independence, confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege,
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro-bono work.61
The rule of legal ethics that demands lawyer independence dictates
that lawyers base their decisions on the rule of law rather than on
client demands, external pressures, or profit motives.62  The ban on
fee sharing63 is rooted in the belief that non-lawyers should not
exercise influence over lawyers in providing legal advice.64
Independence extends beyond a lawyer’s professional judgment but
also includes professional freedom, such as the ability to leave a
client, settle cases, or select methods of defending a client.65
Opponents of MDPs argue that control of a law firm by non-lawyers
necessarily strips individual lawyers of their independence because

58. See Gibeaut, supra note 53, at 23 (discussing the ABA resolution calling for
increased prosecution of UPL violators as an ineffective manner of combating the
lawyers who provide quasi-legal services at Big 5 accounting firms).
59. See House of Delegates Debate, supra note 19 (statement of Sherwin P. Simmons,
Chairman of the Commission on MDP) (mentioning that the MDP Commission
declined to take UPL action against lawyers who practice at personal service firms).
60. See Lawrence J. Fox, Defend Our Clients, Defend Our Profession, PA. LAW
(July/Aug. 1999), at 20, 20 (predicting the disappearance of lawyer independence
should multidisciplinary practice become a reality).
61. See Report, supra note 17 (listing and explaining the core values that could be
threatened by MDPs).
62. See James C. Moore, Lawyer Independence:  Being Able to Tell the Client “You are a
Damned Fool!”, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 5 (stating that lawyers have always been
independent of all commitments except the rule of law); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. (1983) (amended 1990) (stating that the independence
provisions reflect traditional limitations on fee sharing and are enacted to protect
the lawyer’s independence of judgment).
63. Fee sharing is taken directly from the text of Model Rule 5.4.  MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a).
64. “The prohibition against MDPs is rooted in the perception that it prevents a
layperson from exercising undue influence over the independence of a lawyer in the
representation of a client in attempt to subordinate the protection of clients to the
pursuit of profit.”  Background Paper, supra note 4.
65. See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Remarks on the report and
recommendations of the ABA Commission on MDPs, Remarks of Ramon Mullerat, at
http://abanet.org/cpr/mullerat2.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2000) [hereinafter
Remarks of Ramon Mullerat] (stating that independence consists of both
independence of judgment and professional freedom).
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they must now consider other client needs such as business strategy,
medical problems, or family issues instead of only legal
considerations.66  Some observers argue that law firms, at a minimum,
must meet two minimal standards of independence:  (1) all partners
in a law firm must be lawyers, and (2) law firms should allow their
lawyers to exercise independent judgment.67  Model Rule 5.4, which
prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with non-lawyers, was created to
insulate lawyers from external actors, particularly those seeking to use
financial pressures to influence a lawyer’s opinion.68
Additionally, opponents of the creation of MDPs point to possible
encroachments on the attorney-client privilege as another possible
drawback of eliminating the ban on fee sharing.69  The attorney-client
privilege forbids lawyers from revealing client communications made
in confidence to the lawyer or an agent of the lawyer unless the client

66. See id. (noting that absolute independence is necessary and that a lawyer must
be free of external pressures).
67. See L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms that Practice Law Only:  Society’s
Need, the Legal Profession’s Responsibility, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 229-30 (1990) (stating
the two attributes are the minimal standards of independence that law firms should
meet).
68. See ABA Comm. on MDP, Remarks of Ramon Mullerat, supra note 65 (explaining
that lawyers must not compromise their professional standards to please the client,
the court, or the third parties).
When considering the importance of preserving the core values of the legal
profession, the fate of the medical industry is a constant reminder to opponents and
supporters of MDPs.  See Pena, supra note 15, at 328 (warning that lawyers should
look to the lessons of the medical profession in 1990s as an incentive to make
changes in legal practice so that lawyers can control the destiny of the profession).
Both factions of the MDP debate recognize the need to address the issue.  “It
would not read the writing on the wall in time to come up with its own proposal for
reforming the health-care system.  The AMA lost its membership—its leaders had lost
perspective.”  Id.  The American Medical Association in the 1990s was not pro-active
in addressing the changing nature of medicine.  As a result, doctors forfeited much
of their power to healthcare buyers.  See id. (claiming the doctors lost power to
health-care buyers because they waited to address the problem).
The result was the unionization of doctors, which was permitted by the American
Medical Association two years ago.  See House of Delegates Debate, supra note 19
(statement of Lawrence J. Fox) (fearing that if MDPs are approved, lawyers, like
doctors, will be forced to form a union in the future because the values of the
profession will no longer be enforced).
Furthermore, the medical profession used to have a prohibition against fee
sharing.  See id. (noting that the medical profession used to have a rule like Model
Rule 5.4, the rule governing independence).  After its abandonment ten years ago,
physicians could sell their practices.  See id. (mentioning that doctors were able to sell
their practices for $1 million or more).  Commentators suggest that physicians
compromised their authority in the medical field when they allowed HMOs to take
control of the medical profession.  See Mark Schauerte, Law Firms Eye New Ventures as
Big Five Encroach on Legal Turf, CHI. LAW., Nov. 1999, at 6 (citing others’ concerns that
lawyers might lose independence under MDPs like doctors did with Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)).
69. See Report, supra note 17 (outlining the concerns about the attorney-client
privilege being compromised if MDPs are allowed).
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expressly or implicitly waives the privilege.70  Significantly, the
privilege protects communications between a lawyer and his co-
counsel if made for the purpose of securing legal advice.71  Once a
client’s statements are disclosed to anyone for any purpose other
than seeking legal advice, the communications are no longer
protected by the privilege.72  Accordingly, some commentators
suggest that the courts will not recognize the attorney-client privilege
in cases in where client communications to the lawyer are disclosed to
other employees of the MDP who do not provide legal services.73
Opponents of MDPs also argue that such firms present too many
opportunities for conflicts of interest to arise.74  Conflict of interest
rules75 exist to provide clients a reasonable expectation of loyalty by

70. In his hornbook, Charles Wolfram defines the attorney-client privilege:
(1) a person (client) who seeks legal advice or assistance (2) from a lawyer
acting in behalf of the client, (3) for an indefinite time may invoke, and the
lawyer must invoke in the client’s behalf, an unqualified privilege not to
testify (4) concerning the contents of a client communication (5) that was
made by the client or by the client’s communicative agent (6) in confidence
(7) to the lawyer or the lawyer’s confidential agent, (8) unless the client
expressly or by implication waives the privilege.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3.1, at 250-51 (1986).  The privilege
is summed in Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), which states that:  “A
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation, except for disclosure that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out representation . . . .”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(1983).
The attorney-client privilege is threatened in an MDP when a non-lawyer
supervisor is presented with conflicting professional considerations. See Richard E.
Mikels & Mark I. Davies, Multidisciplinary Practices:  Ethical Concerns or Economic
Concerns?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 1999, at 21 (noting that large MDPs could be
conflicted out of many cases and demonstrating that a lawyer may be jeopardizing
the attorney-client privilege when informing a non-lawyer supervisor of the progress
of a case when the supervisor is an accountant, who might have an ethical duty of
disclosure in certain situations).
71. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:  The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 856 (1998) (stating that a party may invoke the
attorney-client privilege if it can show a document has some legal significance).
72. See Paul R. Rice, Our Late Great Secrets?, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 1999, at 18
(observing the possibility that creation of MDPs “could undermine important
presumptions and significantly affect the way in which these law firms should treat
attorney-client communications in order to preserve the privilege”).
73. See id. (stating that presumptions of confidentiality may no longer be justified
after the mergers of law and non-law practices).  In practice, however, confidentiality
is often ignored.  See id.  For example, courts have ignored the loss of confidentiality
component of client communication when documents have been stolen or
inadvertently disclosed.  See id.  One possible remedy to the problems of the attorney-
client privilege in an MDP setting is to abolish the requirement of confidentiality as a
condition precedent to the attorney-client privilege.  See id.
74. See Report, supra note 17 (listing concerns about conflicts of interest if MDPs
are allowed).  But see Rice, supra note 72, at 18 (stating that the attorney-client
privilege would probably not be destroyed in multidisciplinary firms, even if
controlled by non-lawyers).
75. See infra note 157 (supplying a complete listing of the rule).
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the attorney and of confidentiality with regard to a present or former
attorney.76  Trouble could arise in an MDP when a lawyer is obligated
to maintain confidentiality regarding a client’s affairs, while an
accountant in the same MDP is forced to disclose certain materials
because the interest of others must be considered.77  Unlike lawyers,
who are often bound by confidentiality, accountants have many
disclosure requirements.78  Situations could arise where the duty of an
accountant to disclose and the duty of an attorney to keep
information confidential are in conflict.79 Accordingly, opponents of
MDPs argue that combining law practice with other professional
services will significantly increase the number of conflicts of interest
in the practice of law.80  Similarly, many also believe that conflicts of
interest inevitably increase as law firms increase in size.81
Imputation rules also present MDPs with possible hurdles.82
Imputation rules prevent all lawyers in a firm from representing a

76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 4 (1983) (amended 1987)
(stating that loyalty to the client is impaired when a lawyer cannot carry out his duties
because of other responsibilities).
77. See Hogan, supra note 12 (explaining that the duties of a lawyer to maintain
confidentiality could conflict with the duties of an auditor).
78. See id.
79. See id. (identifying the potential problem that conflicts of interest could arise
between providers of professional services within an MDP).
80. See Mikels & Davies, supra note 70, at 20, 21 (noting that large MDPs could be
conflicted out of many cases).
81. For example, it would be difficult for a debtor’s potential MDP attorney to
discover if a non-lawyer colleague from another international office is negotiating an
audit engagement with one of the debtor’s creditors.  See id.
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (1983) (amended 1989) (stating
that when lawyers are associated in a firm, no lawyers shall knowingly represent a
client if there will be a conflict of interest or a violation of intermediary rule would
result).  Rule 1.10, entitled “Imputed Disqualification,” states that:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when anyone of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and
not currently represented by the firm, unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected
client under conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Id.; see A Guide to the ABA Debate Over Multidisciplinary Firms Facing the Future of the
Practice—Now, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at 18 [hereinafter Guide to ABA Debate]
(criticizing the MDP Commission’s Recommendation because it failed to address the
imputation rule, which could potentially be global firms’ biggest problem); ABA
Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing the proposed comment to Model Rule
1.10).  See infra Part IV.
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client that any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from representing because of a conflict of interest.83  Thus, a minor
conflict of interest involving an associate in the United States can be
imputed to a partner in Europe and prevent the partner from
accepting a case.84  Large U.S. law firms that operate internationally
are already constrained by imputation rules.85  Many international law
firms that currently compete with the Big 5, who are not bound by
the conflict of interest limitation, want to change the imputation
rules because they place American firms at a competitive
disadvantage.86
Finally, many opponents to MDPs argue that the legal profession’s
commitment to pro bono work will suffer if MDPs begin operating in
the United States.87  The source of this fear comes from the notion
that non-lawyer-controlled MDPs will be concerned solely with
generating profits, weakening the legal profession’s commitment to
public service.88
II. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES MODELS
The Commission based its recommendation to the House of
Delegates on its observations of various practice models that combine
legal and non-legal services.89  When crafting the new MDP rule, the
Commission looked to models that currently exist in the United

83. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. 6 (1983) (amended 1989)
(noting that imputed disqualification come from the premise that a firm of lawyers is
considered one lawyer for the purposes of client loyalty).  The definition of a “firm”
can become a point of contention.  See id. at cmt. 1.
84. See Guide to ABA Debate, supra note 82, at 18 (describing how the imputation
rule could block a partner’s efforts in one country because of a relatively minor
conflict of interest involving an associate in another country).
85. See id. (stating that a minor conflict of interest involving an associate in the
United States could prevent a partner in another country from representing a
client).
86. See id.
87. See Direction of Legal Profession is Debated at Multidisciplinary Practice Panel
Hearings, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that one of the speakers at the Commission on
MDP Hearing in Los Angeles felt that MDPs might not encourage pro bono
obligations).  But see ABA Multidisciplinary Panel Hears Final Witnesses on Regulation of
MDPs, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 4, at 95 (Mar. 17, 1999)
(reporting statements of Big 5 representatives, who maintained that accounting firms
are already committed to public service work and that MDP will have greater
resources in which to offer pro bono work than in traditional law firms).
88. See Fox, supra note 18, at 1551-52 (arguing that lawyers have a duty to
represent the downtrodden and the poor, and that pro bono work will be sacrificed
if lawyers do not have the professional independence to provide such services).
89. See ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, App.
C, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2000)
[hereinafter ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C] (listing five models the Commission
developed for the purpose of devising a scheme by which an MDP could operate).
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States and internationally.90
Although MDPs are not allowed under the Model Rules, the rules
permit some practice arrangements that provide legal and non-legal
services.91  On the other hand, MDPs of one form or another exist in
Canada, Australia, Russia, and much of Western Europe.92  Lawyers at
the Big 5 accounting firms account for a large number of the
attorneys practicing in MDP settings abroad.93  At the end of 1998, the
Big 5 employed over 5,500 non-tax lawyers in at least thirty-nine
countries around the world.94
Because the ABA has decided to disallow MDPs, lawyers in the
United States who wish to provide multidisciplinary services to its
client must devise practice models that are presently allowed under
the Model Rules.  This section identifies different forms of practice
that combine legal and non-legal services.  In addition, it examines
different forms of MDPs that exist internationally.
A. Different Models of Combining Legal and Non-legal Services
In its Report to the House of Delegates, the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice identified five practice models.95  These
models are (1) the Cooperative Model,96 (2) the Command and
Control Model,97 (3) the Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business
Model,98 (4) the Contract Model,99 and (5) the Fully Integrated

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Noble, supra note 12 (listing examples of MDP arrangements in Canada);
Rubenstein, supra note 12 (listing examples of MDP in arrangements Europe); see
also Richard Tyler, War of the Words:  French Plans to Regulate MDPs have Sparked a
Debate Between Lawyers and Accountancy Firms Which Could Lead to All-Out War, LAWYER
1517 (Aug. 4, 1998) (discussing how the Big 5 dominate the legal scene in France).
93. See Background Paper, supra note 4 (detailing the members of the Big 5 and
how many lawyers they employ in countries around the world).
94. See id. (citing the Big 5’s desire to become major players in the legal services
market around the world).
95. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C, supra note 89.
96. See id. (noting that even though the Cooperative Model is not an MDP, the
Cooperative Model describes the current status of law firms in the United States).  In
this model, lawyers in a firm may hire non-lawyer professionals such as paralegals to
assist in providing legal services to clients.  See id.  In addition, the lawyer may retain
other professional firms, such as an accounting or consulting firms to work closely
with the firm on behalf of clients.  See id.
97. See id. (stating that the Command and Control Model is not an MDP under
the Commission’s recommendation because the firm’s sole purpose would be
providing legal services to clients even though the model allows lawyers and non-
lawyers to share legal fees).  Under both of the above models of practice, non-lawyers
working at the firm must abide by a lawyer’s professional standards of conduct.  See
id.
98. See id. (stating the Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business Model is not an
MDP because non-lawyer partners do not actually share legal fees and are not
partners in the firm).  In this model, law firms own and operate ancillary businesses
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Model.100
Under the current scheme, the ABA permits the Cooperative
Model, the Command and Control Model, and the Law-Related
Services/Ancillary Business Model101 as these models do not
technically constitute MDPs because legal fees are not shared.102  Law
firms in the United States currently operate in the Cooperative
Model, where lawyers in a firm may hire non-lawyer professionals
such as paralegals and retain other professionals such as accountants
or consultants to perform specific work for the firm on behalf of
clients.103  Likewise, the Command and Control Model allows non-
lawyer partners, but the firm’s sole purpose is to provide legal
services.104  Moreover, the Law-Related Services/Ancillary Business
Model permits law firms to own other businesses, such as consulting

that provide business services to clients.  See id.  These businesses must be distinct
from the law firm and can not offer legal services.  See id.  Lawyers and non-lawyers
share fees in the ancillary business, but the lawyer/partners provide consulting, not
legal services, to the client of the business.  See id.  This arrangement is currently
allowed under Model Rule 5.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See id.  This
form is technically not an MDP because non-lawyer partners do not actually share
legal fees and are not partners in the law firm.  See id.
99. See id. (explaining that the Contract Model does allow for multidisciplinary
practice firms, and that it is used regularly outside the United States).  The law firm
remains an independent entity controlled by lawyers, but it rents space and
purchases goods and services from the professional services firm.  See id.  The referral
set-up between the two entities is on a non-exclusive arrangement.  See id.  There is
either direct or indirect sharing of profits.  See id.
100. See id. (describing the final model, the Fully Integrated Model, which erases
all boundaries between the law firm and the professional services firm and is
considered a classic MDP).  Law practice and legal services constitute one of the
many services offered by the multidisciplinary firm.  See id.  In this arrangement, the
clients may seek legal services but not any other services of the firm; or in more
liberal model, the client can retain the legal services sector of the firm in
conjunction with other services, such as consulting, engineering services, or social
work.  See id.
101. See id. (stating that the Ancillary Business Model is permitted under Model
Rule 5.7).  Model Rule 5.7 is titled Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services.
Section 5.7(b) reads:  “The term ‘law-related services’ denotes services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the
provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when provided by a non-lawyer.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7(b)
(1983) (amended 1994); see Cindy Krischer Goodman, Line Between Accounting, Law
Professions May Soon Blur, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Mar. 14, 1999, available at
1999 WL 13725537 (discussing the Florida law firm, Holland & Knight LLP, and
their success at creating ancillary businesses, such as real estate consulting, alcohol &
beverage consulting, and investigative services).
102. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C, supra note 95 (describing the Cooperative
Model, Command and Control Model, and Law-Related Services Model, neither of
which support sharing legal fees).
103. See id. (stating that the Cooperative Model best represents the present status
of law firms in the United States).
104. See id. (noting that providing legal services is the paramount function of a law
firm).
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firms, to assist clients.105  The ancillary business may include lawyer
and non-lawyer partners, but may not provide legal services.106
On the other hand, the Contract Model and Fully Integrated
Model are MDPs because there is a sharing of legal fees either
directly or indirectly.107  Under the Contract Model, the law firm
remains a separate entity controlled by lawyers, sharing the profits
with a professional service firm that provides a particular non-legal
service to the client.108  For example, the law firm might rent space
from the professional services firm, the two entities might share
letterhead, or identify their affiliation in advertising.109  Under the
Fully Integrated approach, one firm, controlled by lawyers or non-
lawyers, can provide both legal and other professional services.110
B. Observing the Practice Models Inside and Outside the United States
Unlike other jurisdictions in the United States, the District of
Columbia permits a variation of fee sharing between lawyers and non-
lawyers.111  The D.C. rule permits fee sharing and partnerships with
non-lawyers in firms exclusively delivering legal services and
controlled by lawyers.112  Although fairly restrictive, the rule does
allow accountants to be partners in a tax practice, psychologists to be
partners in a family law practice, or economists to work in an antitrust
practice.113
Practically speaking, the D.C. rule has had little effect for two
primary reasons.114  First, firms have had little interest because the
rule requires that firms engage solely in legal practice.115  Second, the

105. See id. (describing the Law-Related Services Model, where a law firm may own
another business with non-lawyers so long as clients are aware that the business is
distinct from the law firm and that the business does not provide legal services).
106. See id. (distinguishing the ancillary business from the law firm).
107. See id. (stating the Contract Model and the Fully Integrated Model constitute
MDPs).
108. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C, supra note 95.
109. See id. (providing an example of identifying an affiliation, such as “A & B,
P.C., a member of XYZ Professional Services, LLP”).
110. See id. (mentioning that the Fully Integrated Model includes a single firm
providing an array of services rather than a freestanding law firm).
111. See Janet L. Conley, Ernst and Young Set to Hire Tax Lawyers, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 7, 1999, at 4 (noting the comments of Susan D. Gilbert, Ethics
Counsel, District of Columbia Bar, who stated that the District of Columbia is the
only jurisdiction in the United States that allows lawyers to share fees with non-
lawyers).
112. See id. (noting that non-lawyer/lawyer partnerships are limited to firms that
provide only legal services).
113. See id. (citing examples of partnerships that are permitted under the rules for
the District of Columbia).
114. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C, supra note 95 (reviewing the testimony of
Susan Gilbert, who stated that few firms appear to have non-lawyer partners).
115. See id. (stating that the “sole purpose” of providing a legal service
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ABA imposed limitations on the D.C. rule that does not allow a law
firm with offices in more than one state or jurisdiction to have a non-
lawyer partner in the D.C. office.116  Therefore, the rule only applies
to Washington, D.C. firms that only have an office in the District of
Columbia.117
At the end of 1999, a number of lawyers from the Atlanta and
Washington, D.C. offices of King & Spalding left the firm to form an
alliance with Ernst & Young.118  The firm, named Mckee Nelson Ernst
& Young is only comprised of lawyers, so it is not an MDP.119  Being in
D.C. allows the firm to hire non-lawyer partners, but under the
current rules, the firm can only be engaged in the practice of law.120
The formation of the Ernst & Young firm in D.C. can be interpreted
as a maneuver by the audit firm to position itself in the MDP market
had the ABA permitted such practices.  Since the ABA’s decision to
reject MDPs, the fate of the firm remains to be seen.121

requirement has contributed to a lack of non-lawyer partners).
116. See id. (citing the provision of ABA Formal Opinion 91-360, which disallows
non-lawyers partners if a firm has an office outside the District of Columbia).
117. See id. (applying the effect of the District of Columbia rule when coupled with
the ABA limitation).
118. See Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisioning a Big 5 Law Firm:  Ernst and
Young Positioning to Offer Full Legal Services, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1
(discussing the proposed formation of a law firm by Ernst & Young and lawyers from
King & Spalding); see also Koppel, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that King & Spalding
lawyers created an alliance with Ernst & Young when forming Mckee Nelson Ernst &
Young).
119. See Roth, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that the firm is comprised of 17
attorneys).  See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 BUS. LAW. 951,
952-53 (stating that Ernst & Young’s new law firm is not violating Model Rule 5.4
because Ernst & Young is merely a lender to new firm and will be repaid with
interest).
120. District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1)  Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of
organization which meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization
in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by
an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the
organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to client;
(2) All persons having such a managerial authority or holding a financial
interest undertake to abide by these rules of professional conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer
participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers
under Rule 5.1.;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1990).
121. One of the founders of Mckee Nelson Ernst & Young recently left the firm to
join the tax practice at KPMG.  See Bryan Rund, On the Move, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16,
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A different model for MDPs has developed in Canada.122  This
model is a form of the Contract Model discussed in the Commission’s
report.123  Two years ago, in response to similar actions by its
competitors, Ernst & Young’s Canadian unit established what is
known as a “captive law firm.”124  The firm, Donahue & Company,
offers many legal services including mergers and acquisitions,
commercial real estate, labor and employment, and capital markets.125
It is not an MDP in a strict sense because its lawyers do not share fees
with other Ernst & Young professional firms.126  In addition, the law
firm partnership is composed strictly of lawyers.127  The firm is,
however, a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd., which is the
umbrella organization for all Ernst & Young firms.128  The law firm
pays Ernst & Young a management fee, as well as all its administrative
expenses such as rent, technical support, secretarial services, and
supplies.129  Also, each partner in the law firm is a partner of Ernst &
Young Management Consultants, the Canadian partnership for Ernst
& Young’s non-accounting professionals.130  Thus far, the Law Society
of Upper Canada, the governing body of lawyers in Ontario, has
raised no objections to Donahue & Company.131  Recently, the Law
Society passed a rule that would allow MDPs to offer non-legal
services only where the services supplemented specific legal
services.132  Significantly, this rule would prevent the creation of Fully

2000, at 31.
122. See Noble, supra note 12, at 51 (outlining Ernst & Young’s establishment of a
Canadian law firm, Donahue & Partners).  Ernst & Young worked within the
parameters of the Canadian Regulatory scheme and did not try to change any bar
rules.  See id.
123. See supra notes 99, 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Contract
Model, under which law firms share profits with non-legal service providers while
remaining a separate entity).
124. See Noble, supra note 12, at 51 (stating that the Ernst & Young group looked
to Arthur Andersen’s affiliation with Garrett & Co. in the United Kingdom as an
example of a “captive law firm”).  For a description of the “captive law firm” set up in
Canada, see infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
125. See id. (discussing the breadth of the service approach employed by Donahue
& Company).
126. See id. (explaining the management structure of Donahue & Company).
127. See id.
128. See id. (discussing the intricacies of Donahue & Company relationship with
Ernst & Young).
129. See id. (elaborating on the fiduciary relationship between Donahue &
Company and Ernst & Young).
130. See Noble, supra note 12, at 51 (discussing the management structure of
Donahue & Company and Ernst & Young).
131. See id. at 52 (explaining the process by which Ernst & Young determined its
Canadian practice was legal, which entailed consulting the governing body of the
legal profession, the Law Society of Upper Canada, Ontario).
132. See id. (prohibiting MDPs from doing work primarily of a non-legal nature).
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Integrated MDPs.133
The Québec Bar, on the other hand, has been more willing than
the Ontario Bar to accept MDPs.  The Québec Bar has actually
endorsed MDPs, and because the Canadian Bar Association has no
regulatory jurisdiction, it is powerless to prevent Québec from
allowing MDPs.134  In any event, the captive law firm arrangement in
Canada will provide an experimental model which may succeed, fail,
or be shut down.135  Through its new arrangements in Canada and in
the District of Columbia, Ernst & Young has demonstrated its
eagerness to establish a legitimate stake in the North American
market for legal services.
In Switzerland, the rules allow for the Fully Integrated model of
MDPs.136  ATAG Ernst & Young is currently the largest law practice in
Switzerland.137  Swiss rules, which allow in-house legal practices, make
the ATAG Ernst & Young arrangement possible.138  In addition to
Switzerland, varying forms of MDPs are currently operating in
France,139 England,140 Spain,141 Ireland,142 and South Africa.143
III. HOW MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES CAN EXIST
Opponents of MDPs argue that profit considerations will override
independent legal judgment.144  In reality, law firms have always had
to weigh the ethical duties to clients with the financial interests of the
firm.145  Law firms would become insolvent if they continuously

133. See id. (examining the effects of the new the Law Society of Upper Canada
rule permitting only a very limited form of MDPs on Donahue & Company).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 32.
137. See id.
138. See id. (stating that the Swiss rules allow for joint law and accounting firms).
139. See Tyler, supra note 92, at 1517 (explaining that over 4,000 lawyers, or 10%
of the profession, are employed by some type of multidisciplinary practice in
France).
140. See John E. Morris, King Arthur’s March on Europe:  Arthur Andersen is on a
Mission to Conquer the Continent’s High-End Legal Market.  Can the Accountant’s Beat the
Lawyer’s at Their Own Game?, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 49 (stating that Garretts, Arthur
Andersen’s UK firm, employed 170 lawyers in 1997).
141. See id. (describing the Andersen-Garrigues merger in Spain as the first in a
series of dramatic moves for Andersen on the European scene).
142. See Hogan, supra note 12 (describing a new Irish law firm, which will be
closely associated with PriceWaterhouseCoopers).
143. See Roth, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing an investment bank’s recent
acquisition of seventeen litigators from a law firm in Johannesburg, South Africa).
144. See Background Paper, supra note 4 (noting that the prohibition against MDPs
is to protect a lawyer’s independent judgment from influence by a layperson in
pursuit of profit).
145. See Mikels & Davies, supra note 70, at 20 (noting that the struggle to balance
ethical obligations with the economies of a law firm while providing adequate legal
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pursued client interests above the firm’s financial interests.146  Thus, it
is neither tenable to say that a lawyer in an MDP is unable to use
independent judgment in addressing legal issues, nor to suggest that
lawyers in firms or in solo practice serve their clients free of any
financial concerns.147
Beyond independence, other core values of the legal profession
can be protected if lawyers in MDPs abide by the existing standards
included in the Model Rules.  Thus, lawyers in MDPs may not provide
legal services to a client if there will be ethical violations.  As MDPs
get larger and expand globally, the tasks of managing ethical issues
and potential conflicts will become more difficult.148  MDPs, like large
law firms in the current scheme, will have to establish viable internal
procedures to avoid conflicts of interest, such as firewalls.149
Practically speaking, large MDPs might be conflicted out of many
cases.150
Although ethical considerations and potential conflicts will be a
hurdle for MDPs, lawyers in an MDP must confront these issues just
as lawyers do in traditional law firms.  Significantly, certain
developments in the law could make it easier for MDPs to function.
These potential developments are the abolishment of confidentiality
as condition precedent for the attorney-client privilege,151 and a
revision of the rules governing the conflicts of interest.152  The

services is not unique to MDPs).
146. See id. (suggesting that a firm erring on the side of its ethical duties to a client
will experience financial difficulties).  In their article, Mikels & Davies state that as
law firms increase in size, the partners have less and less contact with the firm’s
clients.  See id.  Thus, the partner may be unwilling to sacrifice economic interests for
that of a client with which he or she has no contact.  See id. at 20-21.  Accordingly, law
partners, like accounting partners, are motivated by a return on investment in a firm.
See id. at 21.
147. See Myers, supra note 42, at 11 (noting that stresses on lawyer independence
exist today and that suggesting that law firms operate free from the influence is
unrealistic given the proliferation of writing on how professional values are being
sacrificed because of greed).
148. See Mikels & Davies, supra note 70, at 21 (stating that potential conflicts
between lawyers and accountants representing clients at MDPs may substantially
diminish the benefits of law or accounting firms forming MDPs).
149. See infra Part V.B (discussing the application of the Model Rules to lawyers in
MDPs).
150. See Mikels & Davies, supra note 70, at 21 (suggesting that even with adequate
procedures for checking conflicts, large MDPs might be conflicted out of many
cases).  For a discussion of conflicts of interest and how imputed conflicts disqualify
firms from representing clients, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
151. See Rice, supra note 71, at 868 (finding that courts over the past century have
honored confidentiality more in theory than in practice and that confidentiality
should therefore be abolished as a requirement of preserving the privilege).
152. See Mikels & Davies, supra note 70, at 21 (stating the belief that the conflict of
interest rules will be altered in the age of multidisciplinary practice); Speakers Single
out Ethics Rules That Need Change if MDPs are Allowed, 15 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF.
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elimination of confidentiality would lower the costs of asserting the
attorney-client privilege and would still afford the protections of the
attorney-client privilege to MDPs and law firms.153  Relaxing the
imputation of conflicts rule would also benefit both MDPs and law
firms because conflicts of interest will be imputed to all the lawyers in
a firm less frequently.154
IV. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULE GOVERNING
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
In its recommendation to allow MDPs, the Commission proposed
adding a new rule and accompanying comments to the ABA’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The proposed rule—Model Rule
5.8—is titled “Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisciplinary
Practice Firm.”155  There are three important aspects of Rule 5.8.

CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) No. 2, at 46 (Feb. 17, 1999) (discussing how many
participants at the MDP Commission meeting felt that Rule 1.10 governing
imputation of conflicts of interests is outdated and should be relaxed).
153. See Rice, supra note 73, at 18 (noting that if confidentiality remains a
condition for the attorney-client privilege, MDPs will be at a greater disadvantage
than law firms).  Professor Rice states:
Under existing case law, the ABA commission’s multidisciplinary proposal
would increase the costs of asserting the [attorney-client] privilege.  In order
to minimize the extensive proof of confidentiality that will be required for
each and every document, the new law-plus firms will have to use the same
burdensome confidentiality policies—that is, much stricter control of the
creation, labeling, and distribution of such communications—that they now
promulgate for their corporate clients.
Id.
154. See infra Part V.B (arguing that the rules governing conflicts of interest
should be relaxed to allow MDPs and law firms to represent a broader range of
clients).
155. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing proposed Model Rule
5.8).  Model Rules that begin with the number five apply to “Law Firms and
Associations.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT vi (1998).  Model Rule 5.7, titled
“Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services,” currently permits firms to own
other types of businesses, such as consulting firms.  Note that Rule 5.4, titled
“Professional Independence of a Lawyer,” also applies to the conduct of law firms
and associations.  The Commission’s proposed Model Rule 5.8 states that:
(a) A lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer or form a partnership
or other entity with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or
other entity consist of the practice of law except that a lawyer in an MDP
controlled by lawyers may do so, subject to the present provisions limiting
the holding of equity investments in any entity or organization providing
legal services.  A lawyer in an MDP not controlled by lawyers may do so,
subject to the conditions set forth in paragraphs (c)(1)-(5), and subject to
the present provisions limiting the holding of equity investments in any
entity or organization providing legal services.
(b) A lawyer in an MDP remains subject to all the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, unless this Rule provides otherwise.
(c) A lawyer may practice in an MDP in which lawyers do not own a
controlling interest only if the MDP provides the highest court with the
authority to regulate the legal profession in each jurisdiction in which the
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First, the rule allows for the creation of Fully Integrated MDPs.156
Second, the rule states that all lawyers in MDPs must comply with all
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.157  Third, the rule
distinguishes lawyer-controlled MDPs from non-lawyer-controlled
MDPs and imposes a separate regulatory system for non-lawyer-
controlled MDPs.158  To be clear, Rule 5.8 does not allow non-lawyers

MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal services written undertakings signed
by the chief executive officer (or similar official) and the board of directors
(or similar body) that:
(1) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer’s exercise of
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client;
(2) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to protect a
lawyer’s exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client
from interference by the MDP, any member of the MDP, or any person or
entity associated with the MDP;
(3) it will establish maintain and enforce procedures to protect a lawyer’s
professional obligation to segregate client funds;
(4) its members will abide by the rules of professional conduct when they are
engaged in the delivery of legal services to a client of the MDP;
(5) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the
legal system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the administration of justice.  This statement should
acknowledge that lawyers in an MDP have the same special obligation to
render voluntary pro bono publico legal service as lawyers practicing solo or in
law firms;
(6) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection (2) and
amend them as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and annually certify its
compliance with subsections (1)-(6) and provide a copy of the certification
to each lawyer in the MDP;
(7) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate described
in subsection (6) with the highest court with the authority to regulate the
legal profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the
delivery of legal services, along with information identifying each lawyer who
has been a member of the MDP during the reporting period, the jurisdiction
in which the principal office of each such lawyer is located, and the
jurisdiction(s) in which those lawyers are licensed to practice law;
(8) it will permit the highest court with the authority to regulate the
professional conduct of lawyers in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is
engaged in the delivery of legal services to review and conduct an
administrative audit of the MDP, as each such authority deems appropriate,
to determine and assure compliance with subsections (1)-(7); and
(9) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in
subparagraph (8) through the payment of a reasonable annual certification
fee.
(d) An MDP that fails to comply with its written undertaking shall be subject
to withdrawal of its permission to deliver legal services or to other
appropriate remedial measures ordered by the court.
Id.
156. See id. (stating that lawyers in an MDP may share legal fees with non-lawyers
subject to the present provisions restricting equity holdings in entities providing legal
services).
157. See id. (“A lawyer in an MDP remains subject to all the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct . . . .”).
158. See id. (providing that non-lawyer-controlled MDPs sign written undertakings
that attest that, inter alia, the independence and unique role of the lawyer will be
PRINCEPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:30 AM
2000] THE BAR STRIKES BACK 271
in an MDP or any other setting to deliver legal services.159
A. Fully Integrated Practice
Rule 5.8 allows for the creation of Fully Integrated MDPs because it
allows lawyers to directly share legal fees with non-lawyers, and it does
not require any artificial boundaries between the legal practice and
other divisions of the firm.160  For example, in some forms of the
Contract Model of MDPs, the legal practice shares letterhead and
advertising, and refers clients on an exclusive basis with the
professional services firm.161  Fee sharing also occurs, but the legal
practice remains a separate entity controlled by lawyers.162
Rule 5.8 does not require the legal services group to be a separate
entity controlled by lawyers.163  In fact, 5.8(a) specifically allows non-
lawyer-controlled MDPs.164  Thus, the MDP may provide a fully
integrated line of services even when the firm is not controlled by
lawyers.165  The rule, however, suggests that firewalls be implemented
in certain scenarios between different groups in the MDP to preserve
the attorney-client privilege.166  The comments to Rule 5.8 effectively
require firewalls to retain the confidentiality of information within
the MDP, such as restricting access to files and separating the lawyers
and non-lawyer assistants from other service units within the MDP.167
B. All Model Rules Apply to Lawyers in an MDP
Proposed Rule 5.8 succinctly states that “[a] lawyer in an MDP
remains subject to all Model Rules of Professional Conduct, unless

respected and protected).
159. See Report, supra note 17 (stressing that the MDP Commission was not
advocating that non-lawyers should be allowed to practice law).
160. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (allowing lawyers to share fees
with non-lawyers in an MDP).
161. See supra notes 99, 107-09 and accompanying text (describing the Contract
Model of an MDP).
162. See id.
163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing Rule 5.8 and how it
permits Fully Integrated MDPs).
164. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (permitting lawyers to practice in
MDPs where non-lawyers own a controlling interest).
165. See id.
166. See id. (“[I]t may be necessary for an MDP to implement special procedures
to protect confidential information . . . .”).  The suggestion of firewalls appears in
comment 3 to Rule 5.8.  See id.
167. See id. (stating that it may be necessary for an MDP to build firewalls to
protect the flow of information between different professional practice areas within
the MDP); infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (describing a commentator’s
suggestion that firewalls may be adequate to ensure that confidentiality is
maintained).
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this Rule provides otherwise.”168  Moreover, Rule 5.8 specifically allows
lawyers in an MDP to share legal fees with non-lawyers, an
arrangement that Rule 5.4 forbids.169  Furthermore, the Commission
reiterates that passive investment in law firms or MDPs is
prohibited.170  Thus, ownership of the MDP is limited to members
performing professional services.171
C. A Different Regulatory Scheme for Non-Lawyer-Controlled MDPs
A non-lawyer-controlled MDP exists when lawyers do not own a
controlling interest in the firm.172  In an attempt to assure compliance
by non-lawyer-controlled MDPs with the Model Rules, Rule 5.8(c)
creates a special regulatory mechanism.173  Under the regulatory
provision, non-lawyer-controlled MDPs must submit a written
document signed by the chief executive officer and the board of
directors agreeing to a variety of conditions outlined in Rule
5.8(c)(1)-(9) to the “highest court” in the state.174  The “highest
court” under the meaning of the rule is the highest court in the
jurisdiction with the authority to regulate the legal profession.175
Subsections (1)-(9) require that the written document contain a
variety of certifications.176  First, MDP must state that it will not
interfere with a lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf
of a client, and will establish and enforce procedures that protect a
lawyer’s independent professional judgment.177  Second, the MDP
must enforce procedures to protect a lawyer’s obligation to segregate
client funds.178  Third, all members of the MDP must abide by the

168. ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2.
169. Compare ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing proposed Rule 5.8),
with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983) (amended 1990) (prohibiting
lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers).
170. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (reiterating that present
provisions “limiting the holding of equity investments in any entity or organization
providing legal services” still apply); see also Report, supra note 17 (reiterating that
ownership would be limited to members of the MDP who actually perform
professional services at the firm).  Thus, passive investment in the firm is not allowed.
171. See id.
172. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (noting that a non-lawyer-
controlled MDP occurs when non-lawyers own a controlling interest in the firm).
173. See id.
174. See id. (requiring the CEO and the board of directors to sign a “written
undertaking” to be filed with the highest court in each state that regulates the legal
profession).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. (recognizing that the “independence of professional judgment is a
cornerstone of the client-lawyer relationship”).
178. See id.
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Model Rules when engaging in the delivery of legal services.179
Finally, a firm must respect a lawyer’s obligation to provide pro bono
legal services.180
In addition to the above requirements, MDPs must annually
(1) review their procedures protecting lawyer independence;
(2) certify their compliance; and (3) provide each lawyer in the MDP
and the highest court with a copy of the certification.181  The MDP
must also provide the highest court with a list of the lawyers who were
members of the MDP during the period; the jurisdiction of the
principal office of each lawyer; and the jurisdiction in which each
lawyer is licensed to practice law.182
Furthermore, the MDP must permit the highest court to conduct
an administrative audit as necessary to assure compliance with the
guidelines for non-lawyer-controlled MDPs.183  The non-lawyer-
controlled MDP will bear the cost of the audit through a reasonable
annual fee.184  Finally, Rule 5.8(d) states that if a non-lawyer-
controlled MDP fails to comply with the filing requirements, the
firm’s license to provide legal services will be revoked.185  None of the
above provisions in 5.8(c) or (d) apply to lawyer-controlled MDPs.186
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ABA’s rejection of the Commission’s proposed changes to the
Model Rules does not prohibit states from creating MDP schemes of
their own because the Model Rules are not binding on an individual
state unless the state adopts them.187  Instead of assuming a leadership
role and designing an MDP rule for states to follow, the ABA declined

179. See id. (recognizing that a lawyer must still maintain confidentiality of
information relating to representation and other professional obligations of the
lawyer).
180. See id. (acknowledging that lawyers in an MDP share the same obligations of
lawyers in law firms to provide voluntary legal services).
181. See id. (emphasizing that such action reminds the MDP of the importance of
the specified procedures).
182. See id. (emphasizing that it is a lawyer’s obligation to insure complete
compliance with the rule by the MDP).
183. See id. (noting that MDPs not controlled by lawyers must be monitored closely
to pressure the lawyer’s independent professional conduct).
184. See id. (reiterating that the responsibility placed on the MDP to comply with
the Rule and all of its subsections).
185. See id. (affirming that the failure to comply with the Rule is subject to
withdrawal of permission to deliver legal services).
186. See id. (delineating the difference between lawyer and non-lawyer-controlled
MDPs).
187. See ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends Amending Model Rules
to Allow MDPs, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 10, at 250 (June 9,
1999) (explaining that the Model Rules are only illustrative and not directly binding
on the states).
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to vote on the Commission proposed changes.188  In its
recommendation, the ABA Commission on MDP proposed a new
rule, Model Rule 5.8, to address multidisciplinary practices.189  The
MDP Commission’s proposed changes to the Model Rules reflect
months of hearings, deliberations, and research.190  The ABA should
adopt the Commission’s proposal with two exceptions.  First, the
House of Delegates should create the same regulatory scheme for
non-lawyer-controlled MDPs as it does for lawyer-controlled MDPs.191
Thus, it should omit the audit requirement covered by proposed Rule
5.8(c) and 5.8(d) for non-lawyer-controlled MDPs.  Second, the ABA
should alter Rule 1.7 governing conflicts of interest to allow MDPs to
more effectively operate.192  Altering Rule 1.7 will decrease the effect
of the imputed disqualification rule on lawyers practicing in MDPs
and in law firms.193
One of the key forces behind the MDP debate is the need for
lawyers to shape their own fate and take leadership on the issue.194
The proposed amendment succeeds because it allows lawyers to
remain in control of the practice of law.  Just as the MDP
Commission’s recommendations require MDPs to nurture
independence, they also preserve other core values of the profession
such as confidentiality, preventing conflicts of interest, and the
attorney-client privilege.195  Lawyers will benefit under the
Commission’s scheme because it allows a lawyer to practice in any of

188. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 92.
189. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing the language of the
proposed Rule 5.8, titled Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisciplinary Firm).
190. See id. (listing many proposed amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).  In the “Terminology” section of the Model Rules, the
Commission defined the “Practice of Law,” so that UPL statutes could finally be
enforced.  See id.  Moreover, the Commission defined “Legal Services” and
“Multidisciplinary Practice,” as well as other terms.  See id.  The Commission also
added sections to the Comment for Rule 1.6—Confidentiality of Information, and
added a section to Rule 1.10—Comments of the Imputed Disqualification.  See id.
Finally, the Commission inserted MDP language in Rule 5.1—Responsibilities of a
Partner or Supervisory Lawyer; Rule 5.2—Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer;
and Rule 5.3—Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.  See id.
191. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (questioning why non-lawyer-
controlled MDPs would be subject to an audit).
192. See Speakers Single Out Ethics Rules that Need Change if MDPs are Allowed, supra
note 152, at 46 (noting Dzienkowski’s comments that Model Rule 1.7 and Model
Rule 1.10 should be altered).
193. See discussion infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts
of interest and imputed disqualification rules); Rice, supra note 65, at 18.
194. See Pena, supra note 15, at 330 (emphasizing that lawyers must seize the
opportunity to reinvent themselves).
195. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (mandating that a lawyer in an
MDP remains subject to all Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and that non-
lawyers of the MDP abide by the Model Rules when assisting in the delivery of legal
services).
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the five models previously discussed.196  In particular, the Fully
Integrated scheme recommended by the Commission will be much
easier for small firms and solo practitioners to implement.197  In other
words, the Fully Integrated model gets rid of the requisite formalities
under the Contract model, which allows the sharing of support
services but requires that the law firm remain a separate entity.198
A. Equal Regulation for MDPs and Law Firms
The regulatory scheme for non-lawyer-controlled MDPs included
in proposed Rule 5.8(c)(7)-(9) and (d) should be eliminated.
Lawyers in non-lawyer-controlled MDPs should be treated the same as
lawyers practicing in lawyer-controlled MDPs.199  The proposed rule’s
yearly filing requirement and the requirement that non-lawyer-
controlled MDPs submit to periodic audits by the highest state court
at their own expense are problematic for two reasons.  First, the rules
create a barrier to entry for smaller MDPs.  In particular, the financial
and administrative costs of the annual filings give larger MDPs and
law firms an advantage over smaller MDPs.  Second, the additional
regulatory burden on non-lawyer-controlled MDP imposes a stigma
on lawyers practicing in non-lawyer-controlled MDPs.200  The
regulatory scheme is inherently distrustful.  Ethical violations occur
in all legal settings, and violations can be just as easily spotted in non-
lawyer-controlled MDPs as they can in other practice settings.201

196. See supra notes 96-100 (describing the five models:  (1) the Cooperative
Model; (2) the Command and Control Model; (3) The Law-Related
Services/Ancillary Business Model; (4) The Contract Model; and (5) the Fully
Integrated Model).  As the Commission states, there are only two forms of the model
that were previously prohibited under the Model Rules:  the Contract Model and the
Fully Integrated Model.  See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. C, supra note 89 (noting that
the Cooperative, Command and Control, and Ancillary Business Models are all
allowed under the present Model Rules scheme).
197. See id. (discussing the five models).  Under the Contract Model of MDP,
companies must share space and use the same letterhead, but the law firm remains
an independent entity.  See id.  For a one or two-person firm, keeping the functions
separate could prove to be a nuisance.
198. See id. (stating that the law firm remains an independent entity controlled by
lawyers).
199. See Roth, supra note 12, at 12 (discussing some critics’ opposition to
regulating only non-lawyer-controlled MDPs).  Some critics feel that if the bar is so
worried about its core values, then it should audit all lawyers.  See id. (citing the
comments of Laura Wertheimer).
200. See id. (stating critics’ belief that it is wrong to regulate only MDPs).  “It is the
individual lawyer who is obligated to satisfy the core values of the profession.  It
seems reasonable to me that changes to the model rules must focus on the individual
lawyer, rather than the organization in which the lawyer practices.”  Statement of
Kathryn Oberly, supra note 47.
201. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (stressing that law-related
activity is not limited to lawyers).
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The Commission erred when it created different regulatory
schemes for non-lawyer-controlled and lawyer-controlled MDPs.  The
Commission should not impose a burden on attorneys practicing in
an MDP setting when it fails to impose the same burden on lawyers in
all other settings.202  The filing requirement assumes that lawyers in
non-lawyer-controlled MDPs need extra supervision compared to
their colleagues in lawyer-controlled MDPs, law firms, or solo law
practices.  Under the present system, in-house counsel are technically
under the control of non-lawyers, and they are still bound by
professional ethics in the advice they give their companies.203  Yet
these attorneys and their companies are not subjected to audits or
yearly court filings.204  MDPs, lawyer or non-lawyer-controlled, should
not be subjected to any regulatory scheme to which law firms or solo
practices are not.205  Thus, sections (c)(7)-(9) and (d) of proposed
Model Rule 5.8 should be eliminated.  In place of the omitted
material, the ABA should impose a rule that regulates both lawyer-
controlled and non-lawyer-controlled MDPs in the same fashion as
law firms and solo law practices.206
B. The Imputed Disqualification Rule and Conflicts of Interest Rule Need to
be Altered
To enable MDPs to operate more effectively in the global
marketplace, changes to Rule 1.7 207 (Conflicts of Interest) and Rule

202. See Roth, supra note 12, at 12 (discussing critics’ beliefs that it is wrong only to
regulate non-lawyer-controlled MDPs).
203. See Carol M. Langford & Richard Zitrin, Has the MDP Train Left the Station?,
N.J. L.J., Nov. 29, 1999, at 20 (noting that lawyers have longed worked in situations
where they are controlled by non-lawyers, but their independence is not questioned).
204. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 24, at 27 (“We question why this [audit]
obligation would apply only to nonlawyer-controlled MDPs.”).
205. See ABA Comm. on MDP, Statement of Prof. John Dzienkowski, Univ. of Tex. L. Sch.,
to the ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary Practice, at http://abanet.org/cpr/dzienkowski2
.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Dzienkowski] (stating
that lawyers practicing in a single entity MDP should be regulated by the local bar).
206. This Comment advocates replacing sections (c)(7)-(c)(9) of proposed Model
Rule 5.8 with a new 5.8(c)(6).  The amended (c)(7) would read:  “it will be subjected
to regulatory filings certifying the adequate MDP’s procedures to protect a lawyer’s
exercise of independent professional judgment and audits of those procedures in the
same manner as a law firm.”  Section 5.8(d) should also be eliminated.  ABA Comm.
on MDP, App. A, supra note 2.
207. Rule 1.7, “Conflict of Interest:  General Rule” states that:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or
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1.10208 (Imputed Disqualification) are needed.209  The Commission
made virtually no alterations in either of these two areas as its
recommendation only included a brief addition to the comment
section of Rule 1.10.210  Under the Commission’s recommendation,
imputed disqualification applies to a lawyer and a client in an MDP if
there is a conflict with any client of the MDP, not just a legal client.211
As one authority on MDPs has suggested, two changes should be
made to Rule 1.7 governing conflicts of interest.212  The first change
applies to conflicts where clients have interests directly adverse to one
another.213  In these situations, clients seeking representation by the
same firm should be able to waive direct conflicts in all cases
provided there is full disclosure by the MDP or law firm.214  Under the
current rules, there are certain conflicts that cannot be waived by
clients, and all conflicts are imputed to the entire firm.215

to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.  When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983) (amended 1987).
208. To view Model Rule 1.10, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
209. See Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205 (stating that changes to
Imputed conflicts rule and the conflict of interest rules need to be made); Speakers
Single Out Ethics Rules That Need Change if MDPs are Allowed, supra note 152, at 46
(describing some commentators suggestions regarding the imputation rule and how
it should be altered).
210. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing the proposed addition to
the comment section of Rule 1.10).  It states that:
With respect to an MDP, imputed disqualification of a lawyer applies if the
conflict in regard to the legal services the lawyer is providing is with any
client of the MDP, not just a client of a legal services division of the MDP or
of an individual lawyer member of the MDP.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.10, App. A (1983) (amended 1989).
211. See id. (stating that conflicts are imputed to all lawyers in a firm when there is
a conflict between any client of the firm, not just a conflict between clients of a legal
services division of the MDP).
212. See Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205 (noting that changes to
Rule 1.10 and 1.7 should be made).
213. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (1983) (amended 1987)
(stating that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation will be directly
adverse to another client).  For examples of a conflict that is “directly adverse,” see
Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205.  Assume client A seeks the services of
a lawyer at the firm for a lawsuit against client B.  The firm could not represent client
B in the matter.  This is an example of the imputation rule in effect.  Id.
214. See id. (proposing that the rules need to be revised to permit clients to waive
direct conflicts as long as there is full disclosure).
215.
[A]s indicated in paragraph (a)(1) with respect to representation directly
adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(1) with respect to material limitations
on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
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The second change applies to conflicts that are generally adverse.216
Under the current rules for conflicts that are generally adverse, law
firms may not represent two clients without consultation and consent
from both clients.217  For large law firms and subsequently, large
MDPs, the majority of conflicts are not directly adverse conflicts, but
rather conflicts that are generally adverse.218  In situations where two
clients seek assistance from the firm in unrelated matters and the two
clients are adverse in matters where the firm only represents one of
the clients, the rules should only require that full disclosure be given
to both clients rather than a waiver from both clients.219  After
disclosure, each client can decide whether or not to continue to
retain the services of the firm.220
If each client wishes to use the firm, appropriate ethical firewalls
should be set up to assure each client that confidential information
would not be used against them in other situations.221  Firewalls
should be mandatory to protect confidential client information and

that the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement
or provide representation on the basis of the client’s consent.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1987).  Rule
1.7(a)(1) is demonstrated when one law firm is asked to represent two clients in the
same matter, such as bidding over the same piece of property or when one client is
selling something to another client.  See Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note
205.  Comment 5 to Rule 1.7 states that the test of waivability of the conflict by the
clients is whether a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should agree
to the representation under the circumstances.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1987).  But see Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra
note 205 (suggesting that Comment 5 should permit clients to a waiver in all
situations).
216. See Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205 (examining conflicts that
are “generally adverse”).  Professor Dzienkowski posits two different conflict
paradigms.  In the first example, there are two clients, Client A and Client B, who are
business competitors in the marketplace.  Client A wishes to retain the services of the
firm for one matter, and Client B wishes to retain the services of the firm in an
unrelated matter.  This is Professor Dzienkowski’s example of a “generally adverse”
conflict.  See id.  Under the current Model Rule 1.10, the firm needs a waiver from
both clients.  See id.  Professor Dzienkowski’s second example of this type of conflict
exists when Client A and Client B are adversaries in unrelated litigation in which the
law firm does not represent either party.  See id.  In an unrelated matter, Client A
wants to retain the firm for legal services, and Client B wants to retain the firm for
other services.  See id. (illustrating another situation where a firm needs a waiver by
both Client A and Client B).
217. See Model Rule 1.10(c) (“A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be
waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.”).
218. See Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205 (stating that only full
disclosure and the implementation of firewalls, and not a waiver, should be required
with a generally adverse conflict).
219. See id. (discussing generally adverse conflicts in relation to large law firms).
220. See id. (examining disclosure rules for returning services with a firm).
221. Id.  Professor Dzienkowski posits that ethical firewalls would be necessary in a
situation where the parties being represented have generally adverse interests.  See id.
PRINCEPP.DOC 8/15/2001  11:30 AM
2000] THE BAR STRIKES BACK 279
to ensure that each lawyer or team of lawyers within the firm will use
independent judgment.222  Thus, Rule 1.7 and 1.10 should be altered
so that both MDPs and regular law firms can represent a more broad
range of clients.223  This is especially true for large MDPs who will
undoubtedly represent clients in many different countries.224
CONCLUSION
As other countries move toward multidisciplinary practices, the
ABA should not sit idly by and let market forces dictate how
American lawyers practice law.225  The ABA should have taken the
lead and permitted multidisciplinary practices.  Otherwise, lawyers
may suffer the fate of professionals in other industries who refused to
address changing trends in their respective businesses.226
The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice proposed a
sensible rule that allows the legal profession to maintain its core
values.227  With the exception of the audit requirement,228 the ABA
should have adopted the Commission’s proposed Model Rule 5.8.  In
addition, the ABA should amend Model Rule 1.7, which governs

222. See id. (stating that the rule should require full disclosure and
implementation and ethical firewalls to prevent confidential information from being
disseminated).
223. Rule 1.10 is the enforcement rule for imputing conflicts to all the lawyers in a
firm.  Therefore, Rule 1.10 will reflect any alterations of Rule 1.7.  By including
Professor Dzienkowski’s suggestions, sections of Rule 1.7 and its comments must be
amended.  First, comment 5 to Model Rule 1.7 must be eliminated.  Comment 5 to
Rule 1.7 lists situation when a conflict cannot be waived.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (1983) (amended 1987).  Second, Rule 1.7 needs to be
altered to address “generally adverse” conflicts.  A new section, 1.7(c) could be
added to Model Rule 1.7.  This comment proposes an additional section to 1.7,
called 1.7(c):
(c) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be generally adverse to another client, unless:
(1) full disclosure is provide to all clients involved in the conflict, and
(2) procedures to preserve client confidences are implemented to protect
the parties in the conflict from having confidential information
compromised as a result using different teams of lawyers at one firm.
Statement of Professor Dzienkowski, supra note 205.
In addition, the ABA needs to add a comment to Rule 1.7 explaining and defining
“directly adverse” and “generally adverse” conflicts.  See id.
224. See Siobhan Roth, A Guide to the ABA Debate over Multidisciplinary Firms Facing
the Future of the Practice—Now, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at 18 (stating that the Big 5
could face stifling conflicts of interests under the present rules if MDPs are allowed).
225. See Pena, supra note 15, at 328 (stating that pain of staying the same will be
greater than changing).
226. See id. (mentioning timber cutters, doctors, and automakers as professionals
who failed to notice changing trends).
227. See ABA Comm. on MDP, App. A, supra note 2 (listing the proposed rules
suggested by the Commission on MDP).
228. See supra Part V.A, supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (arguing for
the omission of this requirement).
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conflicts of interest, so that firms will not be barred from
representing clients in fewer cases.229  These measures will allow both
large and small MDPs to flourish while still adhering to the legal
ethical canons central to the purpose of lawyers.

229. See supra Part V.B, supra notes 207-24 and accompanying text (advocating
changes to the imputed disqualification rule and conflict of interest rules).
